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Case No. 20090274-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Abraham Mario Shaffer,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree
felony. This Court has jurisdiction under the pour-over provision of Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (WestSupp. 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend that
Defendant's prison term be suspended and that he be given probation, conditioned
on his serving two years in jail with credit for time served. But under statutory law, a
sentencing court may require, as a condition of probation, only that a defendant
serve "a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail/' At sentencing, first
defense counsel and then the prosecutor told the court that the State agreed to
recommend that Defendant be given probation, conditioned on his serving one year
in jail, with no credit for time served. Had the trial court followed the modified

recommendation, Defendant's total time served would have been approximately the
same, but slightly longer, than the time contemplated by the original
recommendation.
1. Did the trial court plainly err by not sua sponte finding that Defendant's
and the State's modified recommendation amounted to a breach of the plea
agreement?
Standard of Review. To establish plain error, a defendant must show that
"(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and
(iii) the error is harmful." State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, If 12,153 P.3d 804,
cert, denied, 168 P.3d 819 (Utah 2007). Review for plain error does not lie, however,
where Defendant, through counsel, "affirmatively represented to the [trial] court
that he ... had no objection to the [proceedings]." Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ^ 16,
164 P.3d 366 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
2. Was defense counsel ineffective for agreeing to the modified
recommendation?
Standard of Review. "When an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 'is raised
for the first time on appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing, it presents a
question of law.'" Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, % 11 (quoting State v. Holbert, 2002
UT App 426, | 26, 61 P.3d 291 (additional citation and quotation marks omitted)).
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3. Can Defendant prevail on his plain error and ineffective assistance of
counsel claims that the prosecution breached the plea agreement by not making any
recommendation for the presentence report, where nothing in the record supports
those claims?
Standard of Review. See standards of review set forth under issues 1 and 2.
4. Can Defendant prevail on his plain error and ineffective assistance of
counsel claims that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by requesting "gang
conditions" as part of probation, where the prosecutor made no promise not to
recommend probation conditions?
Standard of Review. See standards of review set forth under issues 1 and 2.
5. Can Defendant prevail on his plain error and ineffective assistance of
counsel claims that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by expressing
"concerns with the defendant's family" in connection with her request for probation
and a jail term, where the prosecutor made no promise not to address the need for
probation?
Standard of Review. See standards of review set forth under issues 1 and 2.
6. Can Defendant prevail on his plain error and ineffective assistance of
counsel claims that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by advising the
court of the victim's views on Defendant's sentence, where the prosecutor has the
responsibility to assist the victim in exercising his right to be heard and a duty to
3

bring relevant information to the court's attention, and where the prosecutor made
no promise not to convey this relevant information?
Standard of Review. See standards of review set forth under issues 1 and 2.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are dispositive in this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Based on a January 30, 2008 incident, the State charged Defendant with one
count of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-302 (West 2004). Rl-5. The State also charged Defendant with use of a
dangerous weapon in the commission of the robbery, subjecting him to enhanced
penalties under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8 (West 2004), and with commission of
the crime in concert with two or more persons, subjecting him to additional
enhanced penalties under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (West Supp. 2005). Id.
Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State. See R103, 95-102,
R131:l-10.

Under the terms of the plea, Defendant pled guilty to aggravated

robbery, a first degree felony. R95. In exchange, the prosecutor agreed to dismiss
gun and gang enhancements; recommend a suspended prison sentence and
probation conditioned on "2 years in jail with credit for time served"; and, upon
Defendant's successful completion of probation, to join in a section 76-3-402 motion

4

to reduce the degree of Defendant's conviction from a first degree to a second
degree felony. R99 (quotation completed in top margin).
At the change of plea hearing, defense counsel stated that the prosecution had
offered to dismiss the "gun and gang enhancements], which would have added a
total of five years to the potential sentencing in this case." R131:3-4. He said that
"the State will be recommending ... both to ... the pre-sentence investigator and at
the time of sentencing ... that the prison sentence in this case be suspended and that
the Court instead order [Defendant] to serve two years in the County Jail, with
credit for time served/' R131:4. Finally, he said that "in the event that [Defendant] is
successful in completing this five-year probationary period,1 upon being released
from the County Jail, assuming that the Court does choose to approve ... that
sentencing recommendation, at the conclusion of the five years, probation having
been successfully completed, the State will be joining in [the defense] motion for the
degree of the offense to be lowered by one level/7 R131:3-4. The prosecutor agreed
that this was the State's offer. R131:4.
The district court cautioned Defendant that there was "no guarantee that [the
court] won't impose [a sentence of five years to life in prison], even though the State
1

The plea bargain contemplated a five-years-total probationary period,
including two years in jail (with credit for time served) and 36 additional months of
supervised probation.

5

is not recommending that [and], in fact, is recommending a jail sentence instead/'
R131:5. Defendant said that he understood. R131:6.
The court set sentencing and ordered Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) to
prepare a presentence investigation report. AP&P filed its report, concluding that
Defendant "presented] a serious threat of violent behavior" and his attitude was
"not conducive to supervision in a less restrictive setting/7 and recommending that
the trial court sentence Defendant to a prison term of five years to life with credit for
375 days served. See PSI filed by AP&P (AP&P PSI) at Attachment, Form 4.2 The
parties stipulated to a continuance, and the trial court continued sentencing.
R105-06. Before sentencing, Judicial Supervision Services filed a second presentence investigation report. See PSI filed by Judicial Supervision Services (JSS
PSI).3

2

Both sentencing reports are included in an envelope assigned record number

R134.
3

The JSS PSI observed that Defendant had "deliberately attempted to present
a distorted image of his role in this crime and minimize his actions." Id. at 3. The
PSI recommended that Defendant be sentenced to a prison term of five years to life,
to be suspended upon various conditions including a condition that he complete a
substance abuse program at the Adult Detention Center for up to one year—in
addition to time served. Id. at 4.
(Footnote continues on following page.)
6

At sentencing, defense counsel explained that "the State [had] agreed to
recommend a year in jail beyond the time that [Defendant] had already served and
at the conclusion of that year ... recommend [that] he be placed on probation/'
R132:4. Counsel then addressed the conclusion in both pre-sentence reports that
" [Defendant] was minimizing his involvement in... the robbery that occurred" and
a police report that Defendant had not only pulled his gun, but threatened the store
employee that he would "blow his head off." R132:4-6.
The prosecutor then "recommend[ed] that [Defendant] be given 365 days jail
with no credit for the time he's already served, that after that, he be placed on 36month probation with Adult Probation & Parole." R132:13. The prosecutor also
asked for "gang conditions." Id.
The victim was not present, but the prosecutor conveyed the victim's request
for restitution and the victim's belief "that [Defendant] should be incarcerated as
long as possible." R132:14. But the prosecutor added, "I did talk with him about the
resolution and he was fine with the resolution." R132:15.

Judicial Supervision Services then filed a pre-sentence report addendum
dated March 6, 2009, noting that Defendant might not qualify for the substance
abuse program in jail and recommending that he remain in jail for three to six
months with no violations and then participate in 18 months of intensive outpatient
substance abuse treatment. See JSS PSI Addendum at 1.

7

The court then addressed Defendant: "[I]t's a difficult decision for me,
because of your age, really. If you weren't as young as you are, there would be no
question in my mind that I would sentence you to prison/7 Id. The court then
rehearsed its concerns with the use of the gun, the stealing, and the looting of the
till. Id. The court then concluded, "[I]t's such a serious crime ... I'm comfortable
with the recommendations that [AP&P] make[s] here, as difficult as it is. Fm going
to follow them and impose the indeterminate term of five years to life in the State
penitentiary." Id. Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment, ordering that
Defendant serve a prison sentence of five years to life. R113.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4
On January 30, 2008, Defendant and two other men entered the Spring
Communications store in Riverton and began looking around. R94:8,13. While
Cassidy Mills, the store clerk, was occupied with the other two individuals,
Defendant entered the storeroom and began loading up his arms with cell phones.
R94:17-18. When Mills went to the storeroom and asked Defendant what he was
doing, Defendant pulled out a gun and told Mills "to get the f

back." R94:19. He

also told Mills to get on the floor or he would blow his head off. See AP&P PSI at 3.
4

No trial was held. The Statement of Facts is taken from the preliminary
hearing and from the factual summary of the offense in the presentence report
prepared by AP&R

8

Defendant backed out of the room, pointing his gun at Mills, and shut the door.
R94:19-20. Mills heard rustling in the store, the cash register being opened, and the
chime that sounded when anyone entered or exited the front door. R94:20. Mills
then exited the back room and called 911. R94:22.
Defendant and the other two men had taken seven phones and the cash in the
till, about $35. R94:22-23.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: Defendant claims that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by
recommending that Defendant serve one year in jail with no credit for time served,
rather than two years in jail with credit for time served. Defendant cannot prevail
on this claim because he invited any error. In any case, he cannot demonstrate plain
error because no error occurred. Alternatively, if error occurred it was neither
obvious nor harmful.
Point II: Defendant has not shown that trial counsel was ineffective for not
objecting to the changed recommendation. The changed recommendation made it
possible for Defendant to maintain the benefits of a favorable plea bargain. In any
case, Defendant cannot demonstrate ineffective assistance because he cannot show
prejudice: the change in the recommendation was harmless, where the trial court
decided not to follow any recommendations regarding jail time, but to impose the
statutory indeterminate prison term.
9

Point III: Defendant cannot prevail on his speculative plain error and
ineffective assistance of counsel claims that the prosecutor failed to convey her
sentencing recommendations to AP&P, as promised.

Nothing in the record

demonstrates that the prosecutor did not convey those recommendations.
Point IV:

Defendant cannot prevail on his plain error and ineffective

assistance of counsel claims that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by
recommending "gang conditions" in connection with her recommendation for
probation. The prosecutor agreed not to seek gang enhancements; she made no
promise not to seek "gang conditions" in connection with her recommendation that
Defendant be given probation.
Point V:

Defendant cannot prevail on his plain error and ineffective

assistance of counsel claims that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by
expressing her concerns about the level of support and supervision Defendant's
family could give him and its bearing on the need for probation. The prosecutor
made no promise not to recommend probation or probation conditions.
Point VI:

Defendant cannot prevail on his plain error and ineffective

assistance of counsel claims that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by
advising the sentencing court that the victim felt that Defendant should be
incarcerated for as long as possible. The prosecutor had not promised to remain
silent as to the victim's concerns.

More significantly, the prosecutor, as a
10

representative of a criminal justice agency, had a duty to assist the victim in
conveying his concerns at sentencing. Also, as an officer of the court, she had a duty
to bring relevant information to the court's attention. The victim's concerns about
sentencing were relevant. The prosecutor conveyed those concerns fairly and
expressly advised the court that, although the victim wanted Defendant
incarcerated for as long as possible, he was //fine,/ with the plea agreement.
ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement in several
ways. He claims that the prosecutor:
(1) " agreed to recommend both in the presentence report and at sentencing
that the judge suspend the prison term and impose a two-year jail term with credit
for time served, followed by probation/' Br. Appellant at 12, but instead
recommended at sentencing that he be sentenced to one year in jail with no credit
for time served, id. at 13;
(2) "did not make any recommendation for the presentence report as
promised/' id. at 12;
(3) "agreed to abandon gun and gang enhancements against [him]," Br.
Appellant at 12, but instead "requested 'gang conditons' in sentencing,"
"intend[ing] to send the message that even though [the prosecutor] had agreed to

11

abandon gang enhancements, she considered it necessary to brand [Defendant] as
affiliated with gangs/' id. at 14-15;
(4) improperly "expressed 'concerns with the defendant's family/" id. at
13-14; and
(5) improperly advised the court that the victim felt that Defendant "should
be incarcerated for as long as possible/' id. at 14.
As Defendant concedes, his claims are unpreserved. See Br. Appellant at 2.
He therefore argues plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. at 16.
Defendant can prevail under neither doctrine.
Supreme Court precedent addressing breach of plea agreements.

The

leading United States Supreme Court cases on breach of plea agreements are
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), and Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423
(2009). Santobello addresses preserved claims, see 404 U.S. at 259; and Puckett
addresses unpreserved claims, 129 S. Ct. at 1428-29.
Santobello.

In Santobello, the prosecution offered to permit the defendant

to plead to a lesser-included offense and agreed to make no sentencing
recommendation. 404 U.S. 258. Based on that offer, Santobello entered his plea. Id.
A different prosecutor appeared at sentencing. Id. at 259. The new prosecutor
recommended the maximum sentence. Id. Defense counsel immediately objected
on the ground that the State had promised not to make a sentencing
12

recommendation. Id. Counsel asked to adjourn the sentencing hearing in order to
prepare proof of the first prosecutor's promise. Id.
The sentencing judge, however, continued with the hearing. Id. The judge
stated that he was "not at all influenced by what the [new prosecutor had
recommended]." Id. Rather, finding that Santobello had a "long, long serious
criminal record" and that he was "unamenable to supervision in the community,"
the judge imposed the maximum sentence, a one-year prison term. Id. at 259-60.
On certiorari, the State conceded that it had promised to abstain from making
a recommendation. Id. at 262. The Supreme Court held that where a defendant
objects to a prosecutor's breach of a plea agreement, the defendant is entitled to
relief. See id. Generally, that relief will be specific performance of the, plea
agreement, usually before a different judge, or withdrawal of the plea, to be
determined as the discretion of the state courts. Id. at 263.
The Court determined that Santobello was entitled to a remedy even though
the sentencing judge stated that the new prosecutor's recommendation did not
influence him. Id. at 259, 262-63. Thus, the Court "declined to find harmless error
because of the sentencing judge's statement that the prosecutor's recommendation
did not influence him." 5 LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 21.2(d) (3d ed. 2007).
But, as explained, defense counsel objected at sentencing to the prosecutor's breach.
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404 U.S. at 259. Thus, the error in Santobello was preserved. See Puckett, 129 S. Ct. at
1431; see also Santobello, 404 U.S. at 259.
Puckett

A different standard obtains where any claim that the prosecution

breached the plea agreement is not preserved. Id. at 1432. Unpreserved error,
including any claim that the prosecution breached the plea agreement, is reviewed
under a plain error standard or under some other exception to the preservation rule.
See id. To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must show not only that error
occurred, but also that it was obvious and harmful. See id. at 1429.5
The Supreme Court's holding in Puckett illustrates the application of the plain
error rule to an alleged prosecutorial breach of a plea agreement. Puckett agreed to
plead guilty to armed bank robbery and to a related felony. See 129 S. Ct. at 1426. In
exchange, the State agreed that Puckett had accepted responsibility for his crimes
and therefore qualified for a reduction in his offense level. See id. The government
also agreed to request a sentence at the lowest end of the guideline level. See id.
5

Under the federal rules, plain-error review involves four steps or prongs.
Puckett, 129 S. Ct. at 1429. First, there must be an error that has not been
affirmatively waived; second, the error must be clear or obvious; third, the error
must have affected the appellant's substantial rights, ordinarily meaning that it
affected the outcome of the proceedings; and fourth, "if the above three prongs are
satisfied, the court of appeals has the discretion to remedy the error —discretion
which ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity
or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Meeting all four prongs is difficult, as
it should be." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

14

Before sentencing, Puckett engaged in new criminal behavior and confessed
his involvement to his probation officer. Id. at 1427. Reasoning that acceptance of
responsibility required termination of criminal behavior, the government prepared
an addendum to Puckett's presentence investigation report, recommending that he
receive no reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Id.
Puckett objected to the addendum, but did not allege that the government
was violating its obligations under the plea agreement. Id. The district court did
not grant the reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Id.
The Supreme Court, holding that Puckett had not preserved his claim,
reviewed Puckett's claim under the plain error doctrine. Id. at 1428. The Court held
that Puckett had not established plain error because he had not shown prejudice,
that is, he had not shown that the error "affected the outcome of the district court
proceedings/' Id. at 1429,1433. Given that Puckett did not terminate his criminal
behavior, there was no likelihood that, absent the government's changed
recommendation, the sentencing court would have granted him a sentencing
reduction for the acceptance of responsibility. Id. at 1433.
Utah law, "'Under ordinary circumstances, [Utah courts] will not consider an
issue brought for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error
or exceptional circumstances exist." State v. Finder, 2005 UT15, % 45,114 P.3d 551
(quoting State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, f 16,94 P.3d 186). To establish plain
15

error, a defendant must show that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have
been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful/7 Alfatlawi, 2006 UT
App 511,112.
Proceedings below. Here, the prosecution and defense agreed to a State
recommendation at the time Defendant entered his plea. They agreed that the State
would recommend that Defendant's sentence be suspended, that he be placed on
probation conditioned on his serving two years in jail, and that he be given credit
for time served. R95-102;R131:1-10. Before sentencing, the two parties apparently
renegotiated a minor portion of the agreement. Instead of recommending that
probation be conditioned on Defendant's serving two years in jail with credit for
time served, both parties affirmatively represented that the recommendation would
be that the prison term be suspended, that Defendant be placed on probation
conditioned on his serving one year in jail, and that he be given no credit for time
served. R132:4,13.
At sentencing, before the prosecutor made any recommendation, defense
counsel told the court that "the State agreed to recommend a year in jail beyond the
time the defendant had already served and at the conclusion of that year, they
would recommend he be placed on probation." R132:4. He then asked the court to
follow that recommendation. Id. When the prosecutor subsequently addressed the
court, she made that very recommendation. She stated, "I would just note that the
16

State is recommending that the defendant be given 365 days jail with no credit for
time he's already served, that after that, he be placed on 36-month probation with
Adult Probation & Parole/7 R132:13. Defense counsel and the prosecutor thus both
recommended that Defendant be given a jail term of one year beyond any time he
had already served.
The record does not expressly state why both defense counsel and the
prosecutor agreed to this modification. The most reasonable inference is that the
parties recognized that the court could not legally impose a term of two years in jail
with credit for time served, the originally-agreed-upon recommendation. Under
Utah law, a trial court may require a defendant to serve, as a condition of probation,
"a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail/7 See Utah Code Arm. § 7718-l(8)(a)(v) (West Supp 2007). Thus, the trial court could not legally require a twoyear jail term with credit for time served. Moreover, by the time Defendant got to
sentencing, he had already served just over one year—so an additional year on top
of the first was, in practical effect, essentially the same recommendation and would
have resulted in a similar period of confinement

17

I.
DEFENDANT CANNOT PREVAIL ON HIS CLAIM THAT THE
PROSECUTOR'S SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS
CONSTITUTED PLAIN ERROR, BECAUSE DEFENDANT
INVITED ANY ERROR AT SENTENCING
Defendant first claims that the trial court plainly erred for not noting and
addressing the prosecutor's alleged breach of the plea agreement. He claims that
the prosecutor "agreed to recommend both in the presentence report and at
sentencing that the judge suspend the prison term and impose a two-year jail term
with credit for time served, followed by probation/' id. at 12, but that she instead
recommended at sentencing that he be sentenced to a year in jail with no credit for
time served. Id. at 13. Defendant cannot prevail on this claim because he invited
any error below.
A. Defendant may not obtain plain error review of this claim
where Defendant where he invited the claimed error below.
To establish plain error, a defendant must show that "(i) [a]n error exists;
(ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is
harmful."

State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, If 12, 153 P.3d 804. But Utah

appellate courts have consistently held that invited error precludes review, even for
plain error. See Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, f 16,164 P.3d 366; State v. Winfield, 2006
UT 4, f 14,128 P.3d 1171; State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 54, 70 P.3d 111; State v.
Finder, 2005 UT 15, Tf 62,114 P.3d 551; State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, f 9, 86 P.3d
742. Under the invited error doctrine, appellate courts will not review a claim of
18

error when "'counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the
[trial] court that he or she had no objection to the [proceedings]/" Pratt, 2007 UT 41,
H 16 (quoting Winfield, 2006 UT 4 , f 1 4 ) (alteration in original).
The invited error doctrine '"arises from the principle that a party cannot take
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into
committing the error.'" Id. at f 17 (quoting Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ^f 15). It recognizes
that parties are "not entitled to both the benefit of not objecting at trial and the
benefit of objecting on appeal." Id. at 117 (citation and internal quotation omitted).
It discourages parties "from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve
a hidden ground for reversal on appeal." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). It is "designed to ... inhibit a defendant from foregoing ... an objection
with the strategy of enhancing the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that
strategy fails,... claiming on appeal that the court should reverse." Id. at ^ 17 n.18
(citations and internal quotation omitted).
Here, the State's recommendation at sentencing did result in a slightly
different formulation of Defendant's jail sentence than that contemplated in the
plea. Defendant notes that on the date of sentencing he had already served more
than 13 months in jail. See Br. Appellant at 4. Thus, if the court had followed the
prosecutor's recommendation, Defendant could have ended up serving an
additional 30-plus days in jail beyond that contemplated at the time of the plea.
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But Defendant, who did not preserve this claim below, invited any error.
Defense counsel affirmatively represented to the Court that this was the agreedupon sentencing recommendation. R132:4. Given defense counsel's representation,
the trial court can hardly be faulted for not sua sponte finding that the prosecutor
breached any plea agreement.
B. Defendant could not demonstrate plain error, in any event
Defendant could not establish plain error, in any event. As stated, to establish
plain error, a defendant must show an obvious, prejudicial error. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT
App 511, Tf 12. Defendant cannot show error, much less obvious and harmful error.
First, nothing in the record suggests any breach, where defense counsel and
the prosecutor presented the same recommendation to the trial court.6

6

In addition, because any change in the plea agreement was not material, the
change does not constitute error. A technical, but non-substantial change in a
prosecutor's recommendation does not constitute a material breach. In reaching its
decision, the Santobello court presumed that the prosecutor's breach was material.
See 404 U.S. at 262.6 In fleshing out Santobello's reach in succeeding years, however,
lower courts have directly held that only a material breach requires a remedy. "Not
all breaches of a plea agreement require a remedy. A defendant is not entitled to
relief when the breach is merely a technical one rather than a substantial and
material breach of the agreement," that is, "one that violates the terms of the
agreement and deprives the defendant of a material and substantial benefit for
which he or she bargained." State v. Bowers, 696 N.W.2d 255,259 (Wis. App. 2005)
(citations omitted).
Here, the change in the recommended sentence, which could have resulted in
Defendant's serving an extra month in jail, did not constitute a material breach.
(Footnote continues on following page.)
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Second, the claimed error could not have been obvious to the trial court where
both defense counsel and the prosecutor concurred at sentencing on the terms of the
agreed-upon recommendation. It would be odd indeed for a trial court to dispute
the joint recommendation of both parties. Moreover, the original agreed-upon
recommendation and the subsequent agreed-upon recommendation were
functionally equivalent. Both would have resulted in an actual two-year jail term,
with the possible difference of 30-plus days.

Defendant was not deprived of the substantial benefit for which he bargained. In
exchange for his plea, the State dropped group and gun enhancements that could
have subjected him to five more years' incarceration. R131:3-4. Moreover, instead
of recommending a five-years-to-life prison term, the State recommended a jail term
of approximately a year— varying only slightly from the terms of the original plea.
Thus, Defendant received the benefit of his bargain.
Moreover," [although the analogy may not hold in all respects, plea bargains
are essentially contracts/' Puckett, 129 S.Ct. at 1430 (citing Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S.
504, 508 (1984)). "When the consideration for a contract fails ... we say that the
contract was broken" and "[t]he party injured by the breach will generally be
entitled to some remedy." Id. (citing 23 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts §§ 63.1,68.1
(4th ed. 2003)). In determining whether the breach of a contractual promise
(including a plea) is material, significant circumstances include the "extent to which
the injured party will be deprived of the benefit he reasonably expected," "the
extent to which the party failing to perform will suffer forfeiture," and "the extent to
which the behavior of the party failing to perform or offer to perform comports with
standards of good faith and fair dealing." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241
(1981).
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Third and most significantly, Defendant could not have shown harm.

As

explained in Puckett, to establish harm, a defendant must show that any error
affected "affected the outcome of the proceedings." See 129 S. Ct. at 1429 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant cannot show that a breach of
the plea agreement is harmful where "he likely would not have obtained those
benefits in any case." See id. at 1433. Here, the trial court chose not to follow the
State's recommendation to suspend the prison term and impose probation
conditioned on jail time.

Instead, the court chose to impose the statutory

indeterminate prison term of five years to life. R132:15. That decision was based on
the court's assessment of the serious nature of the crime. Id. It had nothing to do
with the prosecutor's more lenient recommendation of probation and any jail term
that might have been imposed. 7
Thus, Defendant could not have shown harm. He could not have shown that
the alleged breach affected the outcome of the proceedings, because he could not
have shown that he would likely have obtained the benefits of the State's promise to
recommend a slightly shorter jail time. The trial court determined not to suspend

In Santobello, the new prosecutor's recommendation that Santobello serve the
maximum allowable term was contrary to a core condition of the plea agreement—
that the prosecutor would make no recommendation. 404 U.S. at 258-59.

22

Defendant's prison term. Under those circumstances, the State's recommendation
as to the length of any jail term made no difference.
Thus, even if Defendant had not invited error and if review for plain error
had therefore been available, Defendant could not have established plain error.
II.
DEFENDANT CANNOT DEMONSTRATE THAT COUNSEL
PERFORMED DEFICIENTLY FOR NOT OBJECTING TO THE
PROSECUTOR'S SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS
Defendant alternatively claims that counsel below was ineffective for not
objecting to the prosecutor's recommendation that he serve a year in jail with no
credit for time served. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant
must show two things: (1) trial counsel's performance was deficient—i.e, did not
meet an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) "there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsels]' unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different/' Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,68788, 694 (1984). Counsel's performance is not deficient where there is "some
plausible strategic explanation for counsel's behavior." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d
461,468 (Utah App. 1993).
Here, there is a "plausible strategic explanation" not only for counsel's failure
to object to the new recommendation, but also for his affirmative representation that
the parties had apparently reached a slightly different agreement. As explained,
counsel may well have realized that the trial court did not have the power to impose
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a two-year sentence (even with credit for time served) as a condition of probation.
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (8) (a) (v).
To preserve the favorable plea agreement, he therefore agreed to this slightly
different formulation of the State's recommended sentence to achieve essentially the
same result initially achieved. Thus, a plausible strategy exists for defense counsel's
agreeing to the modified recommendation.
In any case, as explained, Defendant cannot show prejudice.

Defendant

suffered no prejudice because the State recommended a sentence that was
functionally equivalent to the originally agreed-upon sentence. Moreover, the
State's recommendation became immaterial when the trial court chose not to follow
it, but to instead impose the statutory indeterminate prison term for Defendant's
offense. SeeR132:15.
III.
THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT DEFENDANTS PLAIN
ERROR AND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
CLAIMS THAT THE PROSECUTOR DID NOT CONVEY HER
SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS TO AP&P
Defendant also claims that that the prosecutor "did not make any
recommendation for the presentence report as promised." Br. Appellant at 12. This
claim is wholly speculative and lacks record support.
Relevant law, "Appellants bear the burden of proof with respect to their
appeals, including the burdens attending the preservation and presentation of the
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record/7 See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, Tf 17, 12 P.3d 92 (citations omitted).
These burdens apply to plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See
id. at f f 8,17.
Recognizing that trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness may sometimes have
caused or exacerbated record deficiencies, Utah adopted rule 23B, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Id. at % 14,16. This rule provides that a party to an appeal
"may move the court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of
fact[] necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel." Id. at f 14 (citing Utah R. App. P. 23B).
Rule 23B provides a means for an appellant to meet his burden, but it does not
change the burden. If the record is inadequate, the appellant must take the
necessary steps to seek and obtain a rule 23B remand. Whether he seeks and obtains
the remand or not, "an appellate court will presume that any argument of
ineffectiveness presented to it is supported by all the relevant evidence of which
defendant is aware." Id. at \ 17. "Where the record appears inadequate in any
fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in
favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively." Id.
Analysis. Here, Defendant claims that the prosecutor did not convey her
recommendation of a suspended sentence, probation, and jail time to the presentence investigator. See Br. Appellant at 12. In support of his claim, Defendant
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points to the PSI prepared by AP&P. See id. He relies on the absence in the PSI of
any recommendation by the prosecutor as proof that the prosecutor did not make
the promised recommendation. The absence of the prosecutor's recommendation in
the PSI, however, does not prove that no recommendation was made. It is entirely
possible, and indeed likely, that the prosecutor made the recommendation, but that
the AP&P preparer chose to ignore that recommendation, which he was entitled to
do.
Nothing in the record supports Defendant's claim that the prosecutor failed to
make the promised recommendation, that the trial court should have been aware of
her failure to make such a recommendation, or that defense counsel performed
ineffectively for not calling such a failure to the attention of the trial court.
If Defendant believed that the prosecutor had not made the promised
recommendation, he could have moved for a hearing under rule 23B, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, to put on evidence to support his claim that counsel was
ineffective for not objecting to the prosecutor's failure to make a recommendation to
AP&P. There, Defendant could have put on evidence, had any existed, that the
prosecutor did not convey the recommendation to AP&P, and that counsel should
have discovered that matter and objected. Defendant did not.
Thus, Defendant has not presented a record to support his claim that the
prosecutor breached the plea agreement by not making the promised
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recommendation. Where the facts underlying his claims remain wholly speculative,
Defendant has not met his burden to prove either plain error or ineffective
assistance of counsel.
IV.
DEFENDANT CANNOT PREVAIL ON HIS PLAIN ERROR AND
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS THAT THE
PROSECUTOR BREACHED THE PLEA AGREEMENT BY
REQUESTING GANG CONDITIONS
Defendant claims that although the prosecutor " agreed to abandon gun and
gang enhancements against [him]/7 Br. Appellant at 12, she "requested 'gang
conditons' in sentencing,... intend [ing] to send the message that even though [she]
had agreed to abandon gang enhancements, she considered it necessary to brand
[Defendant] as affiliated with gangs/' Id. at 14-15. Defendant claims that the
prosecutor thereby breached the plea agreement, and that the court should have sua
sponte recognized this breach and that his counsel should have objected to it. Br.
Appellant at 13-14,16-23.
The prosecutor did not breach the plea agreement by requesting "gang
conditions/' "Gang enhancements" and "gang conditions" are two different things.
"Gang enhancements," also called "group enhancements," are aggravators that may
be charged where a defendant commits an offense in concert with two or more
persons, and charging gang enhancements may result in increased penalties. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1. "Gang conditions," on the other hand, are merely
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conditions sometimes imposed as part of probation, intended to prohibit
associations that could lead to probation violations. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18l(8)(a)(x) (West Supp. 2007) ("[A]s a condition of probation, the court may require
that the defendant... comply with ... conditions the court considers appropriate").
Here, the prosecutor agreed "not to pursue the gun and gang enhancements/'
R99 (emphasis added).

She fulfilled that promise when she dropped the

enhancements charged in the information. See R2; see also R105. Nothing in the
sentencing transcript suggests that those matters were before the court. See R132.
Significantly, no one asked the court to impose additional time based on the
enhancements, nor did the court do so.
But the prosecutor made no promise to limit any recommendations she might
have with respect to probation conditions. Defendant points to no record evidence
that she did. Absent evidence that the parties expected the State to remain silent as
to probation conditions, Defendant has not shown a breach.
Because Defendant cannot show any breach, he cannot show that the trial
court plainly erred for not addressing it or that defense counsel performed
ineffectively for not objecting to it.
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V.
DEFENDANT CANNOT PREVAIL ON HIS PLAIN ERROR AND
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS THAT THE
PROSECUTOR BREACHED THE PLEA AGREEMENT BY
EXPRESSING CONCERNS ABOUT DEFENDANTS FAMILY
Defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly "expressed 'concerns with
the defendant's family.'" Br. Appellant at 13-14. Defendant suggests that these
statements violated the plea agreement because they sent a veiled message to the
sentencing court that greater punishment was warranted than that provided for in
the plea agreement. See Br. Appellant at 13-14.
While the prosecutor agreed to recommend a suspended prison term, she
explained in the plea agreement that she would recommend a jail term and
probation. See R99. She made no agreement to remain silent as to the nature or
conditions of probation. See id.
At sentencing, as promised, the prosecutor recommended a suspended prison
term and probation conditioned on Defendant's serving a jail term to be followed by
36-months' supervision by AP&P. R132:13-14. In explaining the need for probation
and continued supervision, the prosecutor noted that Defendant's family support
was not all that defense counsel may have suggested, see R132:10, and observed that
one family member had lied to Defendant's attorney and another had procured a
false statement in connection with Defendant's prosecution, R132:14. In sum, she
stated, "And so I think his family support doesn't necessarily give me any
29

reassurances that he's going to behave.... While he may have been a good boy at
one point, he did take a turn for the worst and this behavior, itself, I think warrants,
at minimum, another year in jail followed by 36-months['] probation/' R132:13-14.
The prosecutor's statements about the need for probation and continuing
supervision did not violated the plea agreement. The prosecutor had made no
promise to remain silent as to these matters. Defendant points to no record
evidence that she did. Absent evidence that the parties expected the State to remain
silent as to such matters, Defendant has not proven prosecutorial breach.
Because Defendant cannot show any breach, he cannot show that the trial
court plainly erred for not addressing it or that defense counsel performed
ineffectively for not objecting to it.
VI.
DEFENDANT CANNOT PREVAIL ON HIS PLAIN ERROR AND
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS THAT THE
PROSECUTOR BREACHED THE PLEA AGREEMENT WHEN
SHE PRESENTED THE VICTIM'S STATEMENTS
Defendant finally claims that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by
conveying to the trial court the victim's belief that Defendant should be incarcerated
for as long as possible. Br. Appellant at 14. Defendant claims that "the prosecutor's
statements were an end-run around the promise to recommend a limited jail term
with credit for time served." Id.
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At sentencing, the trial court asked whether the complaining witness was
there to speak. R132:14. The prosecutor stated that Cassidy Mills, the store clerk,
was not there, but that he had told her that he wanted to request restitution. Id.
Mills told her that the stolen phones could not be sold after they had been returned
and that the Spring store had suffered a $2,136 loss. Id.
The prosecutor also stated, "And with regards to Mr. Mills, he felt that the
defendant should be incarcerated for as long as possible/' Id. She continued, "I did
talk with him about the resolution and he was fine with the resolution/7 R132:15.
Relevant law, A prosecutor, as a representative of a criminal justice agency,
has a duty to "'assist' victims in exercising their right to be heard" at "important
criminal ... justice hearings." State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, ^f| 24, 29, 44 P.3d 756
(addressing the Victims' Rights Act, Utah Code Ann. § 77-37-3, and the Rights of
Crime Victims Act, Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-4(1)). Moreover, as an officer of the
court, a prosecutor has a duty "to bring relevant information to the court's
attention." Casey, 2002 UT 29, If 37 (addressing the Victims' Rights Amendment,
Utah Const, art. I § 28, and Rights of Crime Victims Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-38-1
to 77-38-14).
Analysis,

Here, under the Victims' Rights Amendment and relevant

statutory law, the victim had a right to be heard at sentencing. The prosecutor had a
duty to assist him in exercising that right. See Casey, 2002 UT 29, | f 24, 29. The
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prosecutor's conveying the victim's request for restitution and the victim's views on
sentencing was an appropriate means to assist the victim. In conveying them, the
prosecutor complied with the law.
Moreover, as an officer of the court, the prosecutor had a duty to bring
relevant information to the court's attention. See id. at f 37. The victim's concerns
were relevant information. Here, the prosecutor conveyed those concerns fairly,
stating that although the victim wanted Defendant incarcerated as long as possible,
the victim was "fine" with the plea agreement, which recommended approximately
a year in jail following sentencing. Again, in so doing, the prosecutor complied with
the law.
Moreover, nothing in the plea agreement suggests that prosecutor promised
not to convey the victim's position. In view of the requirements that the prosecutor
assist the victim to be heard and that she convey relevant information to the court,
and absent evidence that the parties expected the State to remain silent as to these
matters, Defendant has not established prosecutorial breach.
In sum, because Defendant has shown no breach, he cannot show that the trial
court plainly erred for not addressing it or that defense counsel performed
ineffectively for not objecting to it. Defendant also cannot establish plain error or
ineffective assistance because he has not shown prejudice. The trial court explained
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that it ordered a prison term, not because of anything the victim may have said, but
because of the serious nature of the crime. See R132:15-16.8
CONCLUSION
In sum, Defendant has not demonstrated plain error or ineffective assistance
of counsel, and this Court should affirm his conviction.
Respectfully submitted December^ , 2009.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

jEApffiB. INOUYE

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee

8

For the same reason, Defendant cannot show that any of the alleged
breaches of the plea agreement resulted in harm. The nature of the crime, not any
comment by the prosecutor, drove the trial court's decision to impose the statutory
prison term. See R132:15-16.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

STATE OF UT/JBL,
Plaintiff,

Case No.

vs.

flft79/W>

?2.y

f^C

Defendant.

JZ 5 hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights:
T

J

Notification of Charges
I am pleading /guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes:
Crime & Statutory
Provision
A.

A ycj/^W^brl

Degree

Punishment
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory

tCeiUL*j>r**A

A

B.

C.

D.

1

— S to, con

I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am
pleading guilty (or no contest).
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty_(or no contest) are:
LiL
i

n

JLlL

9 r ^ p^l

<\ / Y 7 ^ r

I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or
no contest):

M:

n-

Waiver of Constitutional Rights
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights:
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand

that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed
lawyer's service to me.
I {have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel,
I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons:

If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty
(or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is / n CCU*A&
CWrl$\jixw\t
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and ther consequences of
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest).
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses- I know that if I were to have a
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and
b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to
cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me.
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could call witnesses
if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony
of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would
pay those costs.
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to
have a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose
not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also
know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal
to testify against me.
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty
(or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged
crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my
case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each

element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict
must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). I understand that if I wish
to appeal my sentence I must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after my sentence is
entered.
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, 1 will be subjecting myself to serving
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or
both.
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of
a plea agreement.
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be
inappropriate.

Y & ' > C->v
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Plea agreement My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) ((jis^are) (is/are not) the result of
a plea agreement between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and
provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those
explained below:

^ ^ ) ~T^r
fl
? H ^vy

^A^S^,4r)<4^
*** cAu t ^

Afrfe
-^^

^ r ^ , < j ~h> j& :'-»
U>^ v:r Lrt ^ -f^> ^

ir\ Q. H° 2»
<s~ £± ^
* 2^

Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge.
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises
except those contained in this statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes
because all of the statements are correct.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
I am 2=Oyears of age. I have attended school through the / '2- grade. I can read
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which
would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the
influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.

I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I understand
that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be
made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest I will only be allowed to withdraw
my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any
challenge to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be pursued under the PostConviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Dated this ( 5

day of

December

, 2 0 ftfr
f

M/

DEFENDANT

Certificate of Defense Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for Ah
Mo-r/p S I K ^ C the defendant
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the' meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent To the best of my knowledge and belief,
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are
accurate and true.

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
BarNo.
tfKlf

Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
/\hr^h->**-> Sn-J*3~£S^
9 defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of
Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which
constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion
to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained
in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before
the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the
conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the
acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest.

PROSECUTED ATTORNEY

Bar No.

9S

V' ¥

Order
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely,
knowingly, and voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.
Dated this

I *T day of

Oee en^!>>/""
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P R O C E E D I N G S

(Transcriber's Note:

Speaker identification

may not be accurate with audio recordings.)

MS. CHRISTIANSON:

Your Honor, would the Court be

willing to call Abraham Mario Shaffer?
THE COURT: Yes.
MS. CHRISTIANSON:
MS. JOHNSON:

He's in custody.

Sandi Johnson for the State.

MS. CHRISTIANSEN:

McCaye Christianson appearing

with Mr. Shaffer.
Judge, this matter, I believe, is set for
disposition today and we do have a negotiated resolution to
put on the record today.
THE COURT:

Go ahead.

MS. CHRISTIANSEN:

Your Honor, what is contemplated

is that Mr. Shaffer will enter a guilty plea to aggravated
robbery, a first-degree felony, as charged in the Information.
In exchange for that, there are three things that
have been offered, inducements that have been offered by the
State.

The first is that in connection with the--the charge

in the Information, the State was pursuing both a gun
enhancement and a gang enhancement, which would have added a
3

total of five years to the potential sentencing in this case,
and those will be abandoned by the State in exchange for the
plea.
Additionally, your Honor, the State will be
recommending at the--both to the--the pre-sentence
investigator and at the time of sentencing to your Honor, that
the prison sentence in this case be suspended and that the
Court instead order Mr. Shaffer to serve two years in the
County Jail, with credit for time served.
Finally, in the event that Mr. Shaffer is successful
in completing this five-year probationary period, upon being
released from the County Jail, assuming that the Court does
choose to approve that--that sentencing recommendation, at the
conclusion of the five years, probation having been
successfully completed, the State will be joining in my motion
for the degree of the offense to be lowered by one level, from
a first-degree felony to a second-degree felony.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. CHRISTIANSON:

And your Honor, I have reviewed,

I have filled out and reviewed a--a plea form with my client.
I read the entire form out loud to him and he read (inaudible)
along with me.
THE COURT:

I see.

That's the State's offer in this

case, Counsel?
MS. JOHNSON:

It is, your Honor, and we would move
4

to amend Count 1 by just striking the language, it's halfway
down through the paragraph, the sentence ends:

and/or caused

serious bodily injury to Cassie Mills, period.

Then it's the

next sentence, begins, "Further."

Starting with "further",

the remaining of that paragraph, the State would strike that,
with the understanding he's going to be pleading guilty to
Count 1 then as charged.
THE COURT:

Now, is Mr. Shaffer the one who had the

firearm in this robbery?
MS. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Mr. Shaffer, the State's made an offer

of--to have you plead guilty to aggravated robbery, as
charged, except the enhancement would be stricken, the
enhancements.
Is that what you understand?
MR. SHAFFER:

Yes, your Honor.

(Inaudible discussion between Counsel and Mr.
Shaffer)
MR. SHAFFER:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.
Mr. Shaffer, let me just explain.

The

sentence that you face is--is a sentence of five years to life
in prison.

And there's no guarantee that I won't impose that,

even though the State is not recommending that, in fact, is
recommending a jail sentence instead.

And if I chose to put

you on probation, they'd recommend that you--that your--with
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guilty plea to the first-degree felony be withdrawn and you
enter it, instead, to a second-degree felony.
are not binding on me.

Those things

If they were and if it were proposed

that way, I wouldn't accept it.

So, I want to make it clear

that I could give you the five-year-to-life sentence and
there's no promise, no guarantee of any kind that you won't
get that.

Do you understand that?
MR. SHAFFER:
THE COURT:

I understand.
If you plead guilty, Mr. Shaffer, you're

giving up the right that you have to a speedy trial before a
public and impartial jury.

You're presumed to be innocent of

this charge and all of its elements and you have the right to
a jury trial.

The State would have to convince the jury

beyond a reasonable doubt that you were guilty of all the
elements of the offense and they'd have to convince the jury
unanimously that you were guilty of all the elements of this
offense or you would not be found guilty.
At the trial, you have the right to remain silent,
no one could force you to testify against yourself; in other
words, you have the right to be free from compulsory selfincrimination.

But at the trial, if you wanted to, you could

testify and let the jury hear your side of what happened.
In fact, you'd have the right to have other
witnesses testify for you and to have those witnesses
subpoenaed and their attendance at trial compelled.

You'd
6

have the right to cross-examine or ask questions of the
State's attorney (sic), you have the right to an appeal.
If you plead guilty today, you're giving up all of
those rights.

Do you understand all of that?

MR. SHAFFER:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.
The only right that you're not giving up

of that group is the right to an appeal, but that right is
certainly limited if you plead guilty.

Do you understand

that?
MR. SHAFFER:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.
By pleading guilty, Mr. Shaffer, you're

admitting that you committed the crime.

Do you understand

that?
MR. SHAFFER:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Are you willing to admit that you

committed this crime?
Did you have a question, Mr. Shaffer?
MR. SHAFFER:

I just asked what the difference was

between guilty and no contest plea.
THE COURT:

I don't think the State would accept a

no contest plea and I don't believe that I would, either, in
this case.

So, if you don't want to plead guilty, of course,

you don't have to and we could set this matter for trial.
MR. SHAFFER:
THE COURT:

I plead guilty.
Okay.

If you plead guilty, you're
7

1

admitting that you committed the crime and I'm going to define

2

it for you.

3

unlawfully and intentionally took or attempted to take,

4

personal property in the possession of someone else from that

5

person or from their immediate presence and against t h e i r will

6

and that you did so by means of force or fear and that

7

used or threatened the use of a dangerous weapon, those--or--

8

and/or you caused serious bodily injury, which I don't

9

is alleged here.

It alleges that you, as a party to the o f f e n s e ,

Do you understand that, Mr. Shaffer?

11

MR. SHAFFER:

12

THE COURT:

MR. SHAFFER:

15

THE COURT:

M S . JOHNSON:

18

THE COURT:

20

Are you willing to admit that y o u

Y e s , your Honor.
I'm going to ask the State, if y o u

would, please, to explain the factual basis for this charge.

17

19

Y e s , your Honor.

committed that crime a I explained it to you?

14

16

believe

But those are the elements of the o f f e n s e .

10

13

you

Sorry, your Honor?
M s . Johnson, could I have you explain

the factual basis for the charge?
M S . JOHNSON:

Your Honor, on January 3 0th of 2 008,

21

the defendant, along with two other individuals, entered a

22

Sprint telephone store.

23

specifically walked into a bathroom, pointed a gun at the cell

24

phone's employer--or employee of the store and demanded

25

more phones.

They then took phones, the defendant

some

He then ran out of that store's closet w i t h , I

believe, it was eight cell phones.

And then the other

individuals that were outside in the main part of the room,
took money out of the till.

Those individuals then fled from

the store.
THE COURT:

I see.

Does Mr. Shaffer disagree with any part of the
proffer by the State's attorney?
MS. CHRISTIANSON:
MR. SHAFFER

No, Judge.

No, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Mr. Shaffer, I'll find that it does in fact make out
the factual basis.
Mr. Shaffer, the form in front of you, your attorney
said she read it, you followed along,* did you read it and
understand itr?
MR. SHAFFER.

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Did you--are you willing to give up

those rights?
MR. SHAFFER:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.
Are you doing all of this voluntarily?

MR. SHAFFER:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.
I'll ask you to sign it then, please.

THE BAILIFF:

Are you right-handed?

MR. SHAFFER:

Yeah, right.

MS. CHRISTIANSON:

Permission to approach, your
9

Honor?
THE COURT:

I'll --thank you.

I'll ac cept it and

make it a part of the recoird.
Mr. Shaffer , do you have any other qu estions for
your attorney'?
MR. SHAFFER :
THE COURT:

Not at the moment.

No

All right.

To the charge of aggravated

robbery, a first-degree felony, how is- -what is your pi ea,
guilty or not guilty?
MR. SHAFFER :
THE COURT:

Gu:ilty.

I'll accept the guilty pl<Ba.

I'll refer Mr. Shaffer to the Department of
Corrections for a pre-- sentence report.
And set sentencing, unless there's an objection, on
February the 9th at 9 • 0 0

o

clock.

MS. CHRISTIANSON :

That works for me, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Mr. Shaffer, we'll see you bac:k

Okay

then.
Thank you, Judge.

MS. CHRISTIANSON

That's all I

have, if I may be excused.
THE COURT:

Sure

(Whereupon, this hearing was <concluded.)
•

*

*
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(Transcriber's Note:

Speaker identification

may not be accurate with audio recordings.)

MS. CHRISTIANSON:

Your Honor, would the Court be

willing to call Abraham Shaffer.
THE COURT:

I sure will.

MS. CHRISTIANSON:
THE COURT:
MS. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

May I approach, your Honor?

Yes, you may.
Sandi Johnson for the State.
Counsel, I received the papers from the

Judicial Supervision Services this morning that you'd sent
over.
MS. CHRISTIANSON:
THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.

Okay.

MS. CHRISTIANSON:
with Abraham Shaffer.

Great.

McCaye Christianson appearing

This matter is set for sentencing, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Uh huh (affirmative).

And I have read

the report, again, and I'm familiar with the information there
as well as letters that have been submitted and the--the
review of the information from Judicial Supervision Services.
So, Counsel, go ahead.
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MS. CHRISTIANSON:

All right, your Honor.

Thank

you.
Your Honor, what--as the Court is aware, at the time
of our sentencing in this matter, there was a negotiated
settlement of the charges and as a part of those negotiations,
the State agreed to recommend a year in jail beyond the time
that the defendant had already served and at the conclusion of
that year, they would recommend he be placed on probation.
And I'm asking the Court this morning to follow the
State's recommendation, which I believe the State will be
renewing later and which time--the State had agreed to at the
time that the pleas were taken--that the plea was taken.
There are two specific matters I'd like to address,
your Honor, if the Court will indulge me-THE COURT:

Sure.

MS. CHRISTIANSON:

--in regards to the pre-sentence

report that was prepared by A P & P and also some of these
matters are echoed in the second report that was prepared by
Judicial Supervision Services.

First of all, your Honor, the-

-the pre-sentence reports, both pre-sentence reports indicated
that they felt that Abraham was minimizing his involvement in
this--the robbery that occurred.
And so I'd like to just review the--the facts a
little bit with your Honor in regards to what happened in this
underlying count.
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The allegation is that Abraham and two other young
men went to the cell phone business, Sprint Communications,
that they went in.

When they arrived, Abraham did not

brandish a firearm, he went back to a storage room in back of
the store and loaded up his arms with cell phones and as he
was leaving the storage room, he was confronted by Cassie
Mills, a very intrepid and courageous clerk who worked in the
store, who actually, physically confronted Abraham, dislodging
some of the cell phones from Abraham's arms.
When Abraham bent down to pick up those cell phones,
he, Abraham says, that a gun which he had in his waist band
fell out of his waist band and he then picked it up and held
it on Mr. Mills and ordered Mr. Mills onto the floor and
ordered him to stay, this would be at gun point that he
ordered Mr. Mills to stay on the floor.

And so he and the

(inaudible) the crime scene.
Mr. Mills has indicated that--or--or testified at
the prelim and otherwise indicated that Abraham pulled the
gun--the phones fell, Abraham pulled the gun out of his waist
band, dropped the gun, picked up the gun and the phones and
then held the gun on Mr. Mills.
So, there is a slight discrepancy in whether the gun
fell first or was pulled out first, but everybody agrees that
Abraham did hold the gun on Mr. Mills, that he pointed it at
Mr. Mills at close range and that he ordered Mr. Mills to get

5

on the floor.
So, I think everyone agrees, including Abraham, that
the behavior was extremely menacing and did involve forcing
Mr. Mills onto the ground with the use of a firearm.
Additionally, your Honor, both pre-sentence
investigators got kind of hung up on whether or not Abraham
had said--had threatened to blow Mr. Mills' head off.

Abraham

said that he didn't make that threat and in reviewing the--the
police reports and other documentation in regards to this
case, I just wanted to indicate to the Court, there was an
initial police report on the day of the robbery in which the
police report attributed to Mr. Mills' statement that--that
Abraham had said, Get on the floor and if you don't stay
there, I'll blow your head off.
But then Mr. Mills was interviewed later in the day,
the same day of the robbery, by a police officer who quoted
Mr. Mills, in quotation marks, as saying that Abraham told
him, Get on the floor and stay there until we leave the store
and there was no mention of a threat to blow his head off.
Mr. Mills, that same day, wrote a statement, which I
have provided to the Court, a handwritten statement, in which
he says that Abraham had ordered him to get on the floor and
stay there and there's no mention of blowing his head off.
And then again, Mr. Mills actually testified at a
preliminary hearing in this matter and was posed a question on
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any statements or threats that may have been made to him at
the time of the robbery and at the prelim, when specifically
asked whether he was threatened, he said that he was not;
although, of course, he said, you know, he was holding a gun
to my head.

I mean, there--there was obviously a--not only an

implicit but an overt threat of violence, but at the prelim,
he did not testify in regards to any verbal threat to blow his
head off being made.
And your Honor, I--personally, I don't really think
it's that important, but I just wanted to clarify that with
the Court that that really is in dispute and it appears that-that even--it's not necessarily clear that even Mr. Mills
would assert that those exact words were said.
I don't know that it matters what exact words were
said, he had a gun held to his head and obviously, there was a
threat, an overt threat.

I don't know that it matters, but I-

-I'm only going over that with the Court here because I feel
that the pre-sentence investigators sort of clung to that
discrepancy to make their case that Abraham wasn't accepting
responsibility.

And I think that he has accepted

responsibility for robbing someone at gun point, regardless of
what exactly--what words were--were said at the time.
Also, your Honor, in the--the pre-sentence report
that was done by A P & P, the investigator suggests that
Abraham isn't taking responsibility because he doesn't admit
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being a member in a gang.

And the--the A P & P investigator

seems to feel that because there was originally a gang
enhancement charged in this case and because Abraham referred
to the co-perpetrators by nicknames that that proves that
Abraham--Abraham is a gang member.

And obviously, the gang

enhancement is more of a group enhancement, not necessarily
indicating gang membership and I think the fact that Abraham
may have known nicknames which--which the co-perpetrators used
doesn't mean that he was a member of their gang or--or I don't
know if they were in the same gang, if they are gang members,
but I don't think that there's proof of gang membership here.
And the fact that Abraham denies gang membership, I think,
should not be seen as denial of responsibility or refusal to
admit what he did here.
All right.

Next, your Honor, the--the pre-sentence

investigators remarked on the write-ups that Abraham had
during the, I think it's been about, I don't know, 14 months
now that he's been in the County Jail, and it's true that
Abraham has had numerous write-ups, but he--he has brought
those with him this morning and I don't know if the Court
would like to look those over.

I have those if the Court

would like to see those; but your Honor, they're write-ups for
passing a note, passing an envelope, passing a candy bar.

His

toilet got clogged and he was sweeping the water out of his
cell into the corridor.

I--I don't see any indication that--
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that the toilet was deliberately clogged, but it's a matter
of--of how he was dealing with the water by sweeping it into
the corridor that was a problem.
He had a pen, on one occasion.

He believed that a

guard had removed some food from his tray to antagonize him
and--and he threw the tray, not at the guard, but out--out of
the--I'm sorry, it was not a guard, but an inmate, who
apparently had removed some food, (inaudible) and Abraham
threw the tray, not at the other inmate, however.
So, I just want to say that I think looking over the
write-ups, I think that they show some immaturity on Abraham's
part, some difficulty adjusting to the extremely stressful and
highly constrained circumstances of the jail, but there isn't
anything like an attack on a guard, an attack on another
prisoner, there's no allegation of a criminal misconduct in
the jail.
And I have talked to Abraham about the--the
seriousness, even, of--of minor matters and the importance of
complying with all the rules while he is in the County Jail.
And I believe that he is resolved to--to not give into
childish impulses to act out, not to do things like--like
giving someone an envelope or giving someone a candy bar that
might seem insignificant, but that nevertheless is a breach in
a security institution and is a violation of the rules.
And I believe that if the Court would--would follow
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the State's recommendation in this matter and give Abraham the
opportunity to serve an additional year in the jail, that
these types of infractions will not continue to occur.
And next, your Honor, I--I just wanted to point out
to the Court that I did provide the Court with a couple of
photographs that Abraham's mother wanted the Court to have
and--and I know that the Court, there are many, many, many
matters pending before the Court and I don't know if the Court
has any independent recollection of Abraham's appearances, but
his family has been present at his appearances, his mother and
sisters are here today, as well as his spiritual advisor, Rod
Gilmore.
Abraham has a very, very supportive and loving
family and his mother wanted the Court to have those
photographs just to let the Court know that--that Abraham is
a--a young person who, until late in his teenage years, was
(inaudible) youth; in recent years, he has been arrested a
number of times, according to their--I think there are a few
or a couple of misdemeanor convictions on his record, but no
felony convictions.

And his--his family just wanted the Court

to know that he is--that he has been a--a good and highfunctioning, loyal, treasured member of their family and they- their belief is that he has the determination to become that
again.
The Court has letters from past employers who are--
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have really valued Abraham's services as an employee and
would--would welcome the opportunity of again engaging his
services when he's released from the County Jail.
Your Honor, also, I just want to draw the Court's
attention to the--the issue of inter-case proportionality.
The co-perpetrators in this matter, my understanding is that
they served a year in jail and were then placed on probation
after pleading guilty to second-degree felonies.

And I feel,

since Abraham was the only person who is known to have been
carrying a gun on that day, it makes sense that he enter a
plea to a first as opposed to a second and that he would serve
two or two-plus years in jail rather than one year in jail;
but I think looking at the way that the co-perpetrators were
handled, the resolution that was endorsed by Ms. Johnson on
behalf of the District Attorney's Office makes sense.
And finally, your Honor, I just wanted to let the
Court know that during the pendency of these proceedings
before your Honor, I've had opportunity to visit on numerous
occasions with Abraham and he has expressed his remorse to me,
he's expressed profound shame and regret about his behavior.
He's expressed, on his own, without being prompted, he's
expressed sympathy for the--the victim and speculated that it
would be a very terrifying experience to be robbed at
gunpoint.

He's expressed regret that he ever was engaged in

behavior that would have caused so much fear to another
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person.
And your Honor, I--my impression, based on my
dealing with him is that his expressions of remorse are
sincere and that he genuinely desires to address problems in
his life that have led to this low point and to--to change his
life and become--to get back on the track that he was on as a
younger man and not have any future involvement with the
criminal justice system.
I believe if the Court follows the State's
recommendations, that Abraham will not disappoint you.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Mr. Shaffer, anything else you'd

like to say?
MR. SHAFFER:
THE COURT:
MR. SHAFFER:

Yes, your Honor.
Go ahead.
Well, I would like to apologize for--

as to the behavior I did.

I really am deeply sorry for just

being so stupid and allowing myself to do something so--this
is a terrible thing that I did, a aggravated robbery and
robbing someone at gunpoint.

I--I didn't realize at the time

how long it would be, but--and how terrifying it would be to
be a store clerk at that time.

If he were here, I would like

to apologize to him.
And I want to apologize to my family for acting the
way I did and letting them down with my (inaudible) a criminal
act and I want--I want to try my hardest if I get another
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chance to get back on the right track and get on with my life
and just be--be a credit to the society (inaudible)
THE COURT:

Okay.

Now, Ms. Johnson, did you have

comments or recommendations?
MS. JOHNSON:

Your Honor, I would just note that the

State is recommending that the defendant be given 3 65 days
jail with no credit for the time he's already served, that
after that, he be placed on 36-month probation with Adult
Probation & Parole.
I am asking for gang conditions, while the defendant
may claim he's not a member of a gang, given that the codefendants he was with were members of gangs, they're
documented members of gangs and the defense has verified that
he needs to have gang conditions.
I was unaware of the defendant's write-ups at the
jail until I received the pre-sentence report, which was prior
to my recommendation.

I've reviewed those, I'm still going to

stick with my recommendation.

It is a zero tolerance.

In this case, although the defendant's is now being
very supported, I have concerns with the defendant's family;
frankly, his father, your--your Honor actually heard the
material witness hearing where the father went and manipulated
a--a gentleman into writing a false statement about Mr.
Shaffer's whereabouts.

And so I think his family support

doesn't necessarily give me any reassurances that he's going
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to behave.
And his sister went in and lied to his attorney and
then forwarded that--that on to myself in order to get him
off.

His father went and procured a false statement; so,

frankly, anything from his family, I don't take to be true.
While he may have been a good boy at one point, he
did take a turn for the worst and this behavior, itself, I
think warrants, at minimum, another year in jail followed by
36-months probation.
THE COURT:

Okay.

And the complaining witness is not here, Counsel, to
speak?
MS. JOHNSON:

No, your Honor, Mr. Mills is not here.

He did express to me on numerous occasions, including at the
preliminary hearing, that--well, first of all, with regard to
restitution, that restitution amount does need to be ordered.
The phones were returned to Sprint, but they were not able to
be sold at all and the restitution amount of $2,136, I did
verify with Mr. Mills and Sprint--or Sprint Communications,
actually, I guess, that that is the amount of restitution for
those phones.

They had all been removed from the boxes and

been compromised, their--the chips and so they were unable to
be sold.
And with regards to Mr. Mills, he felt that the
defendant should be incarcerated for as long as possible.
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I did talk with him about the resolution and he was
fine with the resolution.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Mr. Shaffer, it's a difficult

decision for me, because of your age, really.

If you weren't

as young as you are, there would be no question in my mind
that I would sentence you to prison.
In looking at what you've been charged with doing,
the crime certainly warrants the sentence of imprisonment.
Whether or not the gun fell first or whether you pulled it
from your waist band really isn't critical and I suppose
whether you uttered the words "Get down on the ground or I'm
going to shoot you or blow your head off," the threat was
certainly there.

It's hard to interpret in any other way when

you pulled a gun on him.
And then the fact that not only did--did your
friends and yourself steal the phones that I guess they'd gone
on--into the store to steal in the first place, but looted the
till and took additional merchandise from the front of the
store, it's such a serious crime, Mr. Shaffer, I'm comfortable
with the recommendations that they make here, as difficult as
it is.

I'm going to follow them and impose the indeterminate

term of five years to life in the State penitentiary.
I'll also order that you pay the restitution in the
sum of $2,13 6, that would be jointly and severally with the
co-defendants; but--but given what you've done here, it just

15

seems to me that a sentence of imprisonment is the only
reasonable sentence.

So, I'll follow the recommendation.

MS. CHRISTIANSON:

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)
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